PART II

The search for the missing pieces:
in biology
MARGARET GRUTER AND PAUL BOHANNAN
Repeating what we said in the introduction, we want to underscore at the beginning
of this section one important point that we all agreed upon. It is stated forthrightly in
the paper by Markl below: we are not limiting our inquiries to the relevance of
sociobiology for law—indeed, we aim to go far beyond sociobiology into the rest of
biology and the : behavioral sciences when we consider the relationship between law
and human behavior, especially when we analyze the behavioral s responses to law.
Biology encompasses many specialized and diverse scientific approaches to the still
unsolved mystery of life. Genetics is just one branch of biology in which a lot of
new territory was explored during the last 30 years; another branch is ethology;
apart of ethology again is primatology.
To learn about biologically based behavioral traits in human beings, we have to
work with all the different branches of biology involved in today's pioneering
research. In some areas biologists have come up with data which the most
prominent ones among them hold for truth. " We can build our own hypotheses on
these findings and test their validity.
Behavior can be influenced and sometimes determined by phylogenetic factors or
by experiences during ontogeny. In most cases both factors shape the behavior of
any living organism. The broader the base on which we build our studies the more
likely we are to arrive at a 7 scientifically sound appraisal of the behavioral
functions essential for individual and group survival.
Biological research, of course, has been the foundation of modern medicine which
uses the findings of biologists to treat the individual.
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Animal experiments as a basis for the study of causes and possible treatments of
individual health problems have been universally accepted. A major attempt to apply
findings gained in observing animals in their interaction with con-specifics (in this
case their mothers and peers) was started in the 1950s by Harlow, whose wellknown deprivation experiments with monkeys led to insights in mother-child
relationships. Ethologists, physiologists, neurologists and other scientists agree that
by studying a number of different non-human primates, general principles have
emerged, in light of which we can examine human child-mother relationships. It
means that with only one or a few more steps in the same direction, we can look at "
other relationships (including those among more than two individuals) and
investigate sensory inputs and reactions in the brain as they relate to behavior like
aggression or depression and their effect on legal behavior. In doing this, we can
arrive at behavioral responses to rules. It will illuminate moral concepts and
motivation, the function of specific laws, the effectiveness of law in general. We
will learn about the role of law in the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of
the individual as well as in human social organization.
The major areas to be considered here are the closely linked ones of behavior and
brain. We start w1th the primate record. Goodall— whom we sorely missed at the
conference, but she was in the field in Gombe—emphasizes the distinction between
order among the chimpanzees at Gombe (sustained partly by the patterns of
dominance interactions) and law as humans intentionally practice it. Goodall then
analyzes field data and gives us examples of social interaction among Gombe
chimpanzees. She notes importantly that, although chimpanzees sometimes interfere
in the disputes of others, they have nothing resembling sanctions.
Among chimpanzees certain behavior sequences seem to serve very important
functions in maintaining social order: not only the appropriate submissive patterns,
so necessary for acceptance in society, but also the reassurance gesture and the
seemingly strong need to re-establish "normal relationships." This need seems to
prevail in the individual even if terrible injuries are inflicted or a baby, vehemently
defended by his mother, is k1lled by a group member. The reassurance gesture—the
outstretched hand, the touch that appeases both parties involved in conflict (in
human terms, forgiveness) is one of the moving episodes conveyed on film taken in
the field in Gombe. Boehm's comments below emphasize that we have ceased to
value or even to make sufficient use of submissive gestures in the human behavioral
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repertoire. It would seem that when dominance is no longer complemented by
submission and reassurance, the evolution of traits for morality may be favored in
a species needing complex modes of social organization for its survival.
Itani's paper summarizes what is currently known about intra-specific killing
among non-human primates; its importance stems not only from his effective
summary of the data, but from its place in the context of on-going debate about
murder in human origin myths (Girard, 1980). Itani emphasizes the distinction
between analogy (in which similar functions result from different mechanisms) and
homology (in which functional similarity results from similar mechanisms). On the
whole, we will adopt the view held by many prominent ethologists that moral traits
or precursors of morality in non-human primates are analogs of some types of
human behavior. With the papers by Goodall and Itani, even the myth that human
beings are the only creatures to murder their own kind has been proved wrong-our
vanity makes us not only the best animal, but also the most evil one. Some human
beings appear to have a deep need to underscore again and again the farthest
reaches of human depravity, just as others (or are they the same ones?) have the
need constantly to reassert human superiority over the "beasts."
With MacLean's paper, we turn to the important matter of the brain-that least
explored human organ: the way it has developed during evolution, and the way it
works as one of the necessary, foundations of human social control and law. No
one doubts that the institutionalization of law is primarily a product of the
neocortex, but surely we can also no longer doubt that all the rest of the brain is
involved, and that some structures of the brain are far older but still appear to playa
vital role in our total behavior, including our disputing behavior and disputesettling behavior.
Richard Alexander takes an evolutionary biologist's look at the “central paradoxes
of moral philosophy" and warns us that "approaches that deny biology are
potentially deadly." His essay should be closely compared to that of Masters in the
next section. What both have to say about biology, law and philosophy seems to us
to be putting the philosophical basis of law into a genuinely new key—a key that
includes consideration of the human biological heritage.
Bartley Hoebel's piece is rooted firmly in biology but begins the processes of bridgebuilding toward law. He asks whether there are neural and chemical bases of
rewards that make human beings feel good about being law-abiding and living in the
kind of predictable
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society that an effective legal system assures. In order to do that, obviously, he has
to make some assumptions that can be put as questions to behavioral science, an
essential step if we are concerned about what Hoebel calls "a jump from genetics to
motivation." Hoebel's rather daring position is that "accomplishment of law goals"
may be {there is, of course, as yet no proof) rewarded by endogenous opiates, just as
sex, drinking when thirsty and eating when hungry are rewarded by such opiates (for
which there is proof). "The 'gravitational force' that gives anthropological outcome
an appearance of purposefulness could be a genetically programmed brain circuitry
that releases rewarding chemicals when law rules are followed—which is to say,
when the perception matches the standard. Why else do we feel "good" when we
behave "well"? As Hoebel says, " According to this theory, when we pick a rule, any
rule, and obey it, perhaps the brain releases some opiate. That much could be
innately programmed. The rules themselves could either be innate (like swallowing)
or learned {washing food). He suggests that there is one master "law": "Thou shalt
match behavior to behavior model, and if you fail, adapt either the behavior or the
model. It is what Powers was saying in 1973 when he entitled his book Behavior:
the Control of Perception. Hoebel adds: "Model matching is the law of laws." In
these circumstances, we must discover "the evolutionary, neural and social
principIes by which people redefine their relationships as the conditions of life
change.

